Reference
Security model and risks
The limits of the current trust model, emergency behavior, and user-facing risk disclosures.
Unaudited for MainnetExplicit trust boundaries
- Coin randomness
- Cryptographically verifiable output; a single node can still withhold fulfillment.
- Parity outcome
- Frozen public Binance record plus a FLIP Reporter Set; Binance does not sign the Ticket.
- JIT
- Authorized quotes and approved venues; execution, liquidity, and token transfer can fail temporarily.
- Holding/Holder
- Finalized indexer reconstruction plus Publisher and independent rootApprover dual control, exact EIP-712 root approval, and Merkle proofs. Mainnet may use ERC-1271 governance; the contract does not replay the full holder ledger.
- Community RWA
- Onchain identity hashes do not independently prove custody, authenticity, legal rights, or issuer solvency.
Pause is risk-off, not debt cancellation
The emergency guardian can pause only allowlisted new-risk targets. Unpause and parameter recovery remain Timelock-governed. Existing settlement, timeout refund, JIT retry, cash claim, and Holder claim paths must remain usable while admission is paused.
User risks
- FLIP and Community tokens can be volatile, illiquid, or lose all value.
- 3% Hook fee, 0.30% LP fee, price impact, slippage, and gas can make round-trip trading expensive.
- The 3.5% game fee creates negative expected value for the ordinary 50/50 2x game before market costs.
- VRF, reporter, RPC, indexer, wallet, execution venue, and token contracts can fail or delay completion.
- Synthetic Testnet assets have no real-world value. A symbol alone does not establish ownership of an underlying stock or object.
- No repository test or documentation page is an independent security audit or investment advice.
